In accordance with the topic of the thesis, the deliberation of this section is intended to the theory of Speech Act since this theory is the writer’s tool to analyze the data. Cook (1989: 23) states that speech acts provides us with a means of probing beneath the surface of discourse and establishing the function of what is being said.
J.L Austin as quoted by Palmer (1981: 161) introduces Speech Act Theory, which explains meaning in communication. He stated that language is used to perform actions. Or in brief, when we speak, as a matter of fact we do speech acts; hence, both focus on how meaning and action are related to language.
Lavinson (1986: 236) mentioned that there are three kinds of acts, LocutionaryAct, Illocutionary Act and Perlocutionary Act. The first is locutionary act, According to Schiffrin (1994: 53) locutionary act deals with the uttering of an expression with sense and reference, for example using sounds and words with meaning, for example “This room is hot”, the locutionary act is the utterance itself and its literal meaning. The second is Illocutionary act. Schiffrin (1994: 53) said that the illocutionary act deals with performance after uttering a certain sentence in which the speaker brings one or more result of the utterance. For example; when one says, “This room is hot”, he intends someone who hears him, will turn on the Air Conditioner. The third is Perlocutionary act. According to Schiffrin (1994: 54), perlocutionary act deals with the effect on the audience by means of uttering sentences, for example when B hears A say “This room is hot” then B will turn on the air Conditioner or open the window.
There are much brighter explanations concerning those acts. Palmer (1981: 162) stated that in the locutionary act, one is ‘saying something’, yet he may also use the locution for particular purposes, such as to answer a question, to announce a verdict, to give warning, etc. Here, he is performing an illocutionary act. So, if there is someone saying, “Kill her!”, in certain circumstances that utterance has the illocutionary force of – variously – ordering, advising the addressee to kill the woman.
Traugott and Pratt as quoted by Olivia (2001: 14) classify seven types of illocutionary acts. The classifications are:
1. Representatives
Undertake to represent a state of affairs, such as stating, claiming hypothesizing, describing, predicting, telling, insisting, suggesting or swearing that something is the case.
2. Expressive
Express only the speaker’s psychological attitude toward some state of affairs, such as congratulating, thanking, deploring, condoling, welcoming, and greeting, etc.
3. Verdictives
Deliver a finding as to value or fact, and thus that rate some entity or situation on a scale, such as assessing, ranking, estimating, diagnosing, grading, and all other judgmental.
4. Directives
Get the addressee to do something, such as requesting, commanding, pleading, inviting, questioning, daring and insisting or suggesting that someone do something.
5. Commissives
Commit the speaker to do something, but also include declarations or announcements of intention, for example promising, threatening, and vowing.
6. Declarations
Bring about the state of affairs they refer to, for instance blessing, firing, baptizing, biding, passing sentence, arresting, and marrying.
7. Phatic Function
Illucotionary act is used to maintain the social relationship, open the channel or check that the function is working, either for social reasons (‘Hello’, ‘lovely weather’, ‘do you come here often?’) or for practical ones (‘Can you hear me?’, “Are you still there?’, ‘can you see the blackboard from the back there?’, ‘Can you read my writing?’).
Austin as quoted by Raskin (1985: 55) stated although Speech act is a means for serious and normal used language, Speech Acts is also applicable to humor. One of the mechanisms to produce humorous effect is by deliberately violating the rules of speech act. The perlocutionary act is made not inconsequently following the illocutionary act. The hearer deliberately ignores the illocutionary act and accepts the message as stated in the illocutionary act. This being ignorant or pretending to be ignorant is often so unexpected that sounds are humorous, such as in the following example as quoted in Soedjatmiko (1988: 100)
A stranger entered the building and asked a boy standing in the lobby, “Can you tell me where Mr. Smith lives?” The lad smiled and replied pleasantly “Yes Sir, I’ll show you.” Six flights the boy pointed out the room as that belonging to Mr. Smith. The man pounded on the door repeatedly and after no response, he commented, “He is not here.” The boy replied, “Oh no sir, Mr. Smith was downstairs waiting in the lobby”
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